

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1979

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM: [REDACTED]  
Assistant National Intelligence  
Officer for China

SUBJECT: Warning Assessment: China

1. Attached is the assessment prepared on the basis of community views expressed at the warning meeting held on 21 March. This memorandum has not been coordinated with the participants but is being circulated among them.

2. The next warning meeting will be held on Monday, 16 April at 1400 hours in room 7E-62 CIA Headquarters. Please provide the name of your representative to [REDACTED] prior to COB Friday, 13 April 1979.

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Attachment:  
Memo

Distribution:

State - Mrs. Patricia Barnett  
NSA - [REDACTED]  
Army - Col. Jack B. Churchill  
A. F. - Major Wally Astor  
Navy - Capt. George B. Pressly  
DIA - [REDACTED]  
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NFAC No. 1587-79

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

28 March 1979

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National  
Foreign Assessment

National Intelligence Officer  
for Warning

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FROM:

Assistant National Intelligence  
Officer for China

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: China

Summary

Community China analysts at our meeting on 21 March were still decompressing from the recent war. The general consensus was that major problems remained in Indochina, but that the situation was much less dangerous than it had been at any time in the past several months. We examined three problems in particular: the possibility of renewed Sino-Vietnamese hostilities as Vietnamese forces built up in the border area; the Kampuchean and Laotian situations as they affect China's perceptions of its interests in Southeast Asia; and the Sino-Soviet border. These issues were generally viewed as continuing, festering problems, but there was little support for the idea that any of them, singly or in combination, were likely to reach flash point in the short term.

1. Possibility of Renewed Sino-Vietnamese Hostilities.  
In general community representatives felt that, while the possibility of isolated fire-fights along the border was

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fairly high, that of renewed major hostilities was relatively low. Our assessment was hampered by the recurrent problem that we were unable to establish Vietnamese OB with any certainty, but most analysts thought that even if the Vietnamese buildup was of major proportions Hanoi would still be in no position to attack China, while the Chinese were unlikely to mount a new offensive (as opposed to sporadic border raids) in the absence of a major Vietnamese attack. Most representatives felt that negotiations would take place in the fairly near future, but nearly all thought that they would be very difficult and drawn out. A number of us felt that drawing a boundary in the Tonkin Gulf would be even more difficult than redefining the land border. We discussed briefly the possibility that the Soviets would transport Vietnamese for an attack on the Paracel Islands, but there was little support for this idea.

2. Kampuchea and Laos. The consensus was that things would go on in Kampuchea pretty much as they have been for a number of months--the Vietnamese would be unable fully to control the country but would not give up trying. The possibility that Hanoi might be unable to keep a grip on western Kampuchea was raised, but most representatives appeared to think it was too early to tell. There was general agreement that China would continue to nourish the guerrillas, but most of us thought Beijing found Pol Pot distasteful and would get rid of him if it could. It was recognized this might be impossible, however. Most representatives believed there was little factual basis for charges that the Chinese were preparing to invade Laos. There was general agreement that Beijing had the option of nurturing a renewed guerrilla movement in central Laos (as well as in the border areas), and many of us thought the Chinese would take up this option. No one seemed to think this would result in major Sino-Vietnamese hostilities, however.

3. Sino-Soviet Border. The meeting treated this issue somewhat more summarily than the previous topics; the question of a Soviet attack remained primarily a problem for our Soviet colleagues. None of us thought the major Soviet exercise then underway was a cover for a planned Soviet attack on China; the general consensus was that the moment for such an attack had past. Many of us thought the exercise was at least partly intended as a warning to the Chinese, however. Many of us thought the major problem was the possibility of

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a greatly enhanced Soviet presence in Vietnam, rather than tensions on the common border. Generally representatives believed that Moscow had not yet acquired base rights in Vietnam, but most thought the situation was still fluid and that the final word on the Soviet presence in Vietnam had not yet been written.



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cc: DDCI

THE DIRECTOR OF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

28 March 1979

National Intelligence Officers

TO: Mr. David Dean  
Director  
American Institute in  
Taiwan (Washington)  
P.O. Box 1612  
Washington, D.C. 20013

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
National Intelligence Officer  
for China

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David,

Attached herewith is a copy of the  
article on Stape Roy from the 19 March  
New York Times that I mentioned to you  
and Mary the other night at dinner.

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[REDACTED]

## China Hand: Young, Witty And Untiring

By EDWARD COWAN

Special to The New York Times

PEKING — When W. Michael Blumenthal, the Secretary of the Treasury, conferred here with Deng Xiaoping, the senior Deputy Prime Minister, and Hua Guofeng, the party chairman, the man seated at the Secretary's right hand on both occasions was J. Stapleton Roy, a 43-year-old Foreign Service officer who spent much of his boyhood in China.

Each time, Mr. Blumenthal was received in the late afternoon. Afterward it fell to Mr. Roy to write a hurried cable to the State Department reporting on the conversations and then turn up, on time and looking unwilted, for a dinner party or official banquet.

Mr. Roy was more than the Foreign Service officer who took notes in a spiral notebook and wrote the cable. As the deputy chief of mission at the United States Embassy here, he was also responsible for arranging with the Chinese the key details of Mr. Blumenthal's four-day negotiating mission at the end of February and beginning of March — whom he would see, what the agenda would be, what achievements both sides might reasonably expect and what issues were not ready for resolution.

He had a similar task on a larger scale in preparing for Mr. Deng's visit to Washington in late January. Mr. Roy was responsible then for the working-level talks in Peking that prepared the three exchange agreements — consular, cultural and scientific — that Deputy Prime Minister Deng and President Carter concluded.

### He Prepared Treasury Secretary

Before each of Mr. Blumenthal's negotiating sessions, Mr. Roy reviewed with him the subjects to be discussed. He made sure Mr. Blumenthal knew what had been said to and by the Chinese and what they were likely to say. He briefed Mr. Blumenthal on the negotiating style of the Chinese, how to raise subjects and how to give no offense when giving no ground.

Mr. Roy knows the Chinese well. He was born in Nanjing of American parents on June 16, 1933, and lived primarily in China until he went to Princeton. There he majored in Asian and American history. Later he attended the University of Washington in Seattle, where he took Mongolian studies.

His father was an educational missionary who taught philosophy at the university in Nanjing, the former capital. World War II forced the Roy family and the Government of Chiang Kai-shek to relocate to Chongqing, in the western province of Sichuan, to escape the Japanese occupation.

He recalls a Fourth of July

The Roy family stayed in Chongqing through the war, went back to the United States for three years and returned to Nanjing in 1948.

At ceremonies marking the elevation to embassy status of what had been the United States liaison office in Peking, Mr. Roy recalled that as a boy of 14 he attended the last Fourth of July celebration at the American Embassy in Nanjing, in 1949. Before the year was out the Communists had gained control of all of China.

After the United States broke relations with China, the State Department's "old China hands" — men like John Paton Davies Jr. and John Carter Vincent — were blamed for the Communist victory and driven into retirement.

Since 1971 the United States and China have gradually been getting reacquainted and a new generation of China hands is emerging in the American Government. They are under 50, and several are under 40. They all speak and read Chinese. They include, in addition to Mr. Roy, Donald M. Anderson, Scott Hallford, Donald Kaiser, B. Lynn Pascoe and William F. Rope, all of the State Department, Nicholas Platt and Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council staff, and Charles W. Freeman Jr. of the International Communications Agency.

Although Mr. Roy's gray hair and dark-frame eyeglasses tend to make him look like a college professor who is unremittingly serious, he is actually a bit of a cutup who can grin and pose for a photographer with instant animation, making wisecracks all the while and seeming not the least bit self-conscious.

#### Warm but Straightforward

Mr. Roy combines personal warmth with a straightforward manner. "He knows the Chinese well," said Mr. Blumenthal, "and is very friendly with them. At the same time he is not afraid to tell them what he thinks."

Mr. Roy seems sure of himself. In preparing the Blumenthal visit, he told the Chinese in positive but polite terms exactly how the United States wanted to set up a proposed joint economic committee. The Chinese went along.

In a capital that is desperately short of housing for its citizens and foreign diplomats, Mr. Roy, his wife, the former Elissandra N. Fiore, and their three sons, aged 6 months to 7 years, have a four-bedroom apartment with a large living room, a dining room and a den.

For recreation the Roys do such things as visit the Ming tombs, climb in the hills west of Peking, play tennis, ice skate in a Peking park and scour the furniture and antique shops. Mrs. Roy, who has a master's degree in applied linguistics, is helping the Chinese Government develop a program to train teachers of English.